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Abstract— The Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPV6) proposed to 
replace IPV4 to solve scalability challenges and improve 
quality of service and security. Current implementation of IPv6 
uses static value that is determined from the Media Access 
Control (MAC) address as the Interface Identifier (IID). This 
results in a deterministic IID for each user that is the same 
regardless of any network changes. This provides an 
eavesdropper with the ability to easily track the physical 
location of the communicating nodes using simple tools, such 
as ping and traceroute. Moreover, this address generation 
method provides a means to correlate network traffic with a 
specific user which can be achieved by filtering the IID and 
traffic analysis.  These serious privacy breaches need to be 
addressed before widespread deployment of IPv6. In this paper 
we propose a privacy-enhanced method for generating IID 
which combines different network parameters. The proposed 
method generates non-deterministic IIDs that is resistance 
against correlation attack. We validate our approach using 
Wireshark, ping and traceroute tools and show that our 
proposed approach achieves better privacy compared to the 
existing IID generation methods.   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The explosive growth of the number of Internet users and 
Internet-connected devices has overwhelmed IPv4 and has 
driven the development of the next generation Internet 
protocol, IPv6 [1]. IPv4 32-bit address space provides a 
maximum of 232 address which is approximately 4.29 billion 
addresses. With the current world population of over 7 billion 
people, even if it were possible to use 100% of the IPv4 address 
space, we would still not be able to provide IP address for 
everyone. IPv6 on the other hand uses a 128-bit address, which 
means that we have a maximum of 2128 addresses available [1] 
[2] [3]. 
The 32-bit IPv4 addresses are generated manually or using 
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP). However, 128-
bit IPv6 address is too long for manual configuration. In IPv6, 
address generation is divided into stateless address 
autoconfiguration (SLAAC) and DHCPv6. DHCPv6 is similar 
to DHCPv4 and all the addresses are managed centrally by a 
DHCP server [3] [4]. SLAAC uses modified Extended Unique 
Identifier (EUI) algorithm to generate the Interface Identifier 
(IID) portion of the IPv6 address (this has been explained in 
RFC4941) [5]. EUI-64 uses 48-bit MAC address of an interface 
to generate 64-bit modified EUI-64 for the IID.  As indicated 
in RFC4941 [6], this address generation method could allow an 
adversary to analyze packet content, packet size and packet 
timing, however the privacy implications that arise from 
SLAAC have not been addressed in that document.  
The use of MAC address in IID generation has serious privacy 
concern. Considering that MAC is the unique identifier of each 
network-connected device, having access to the MAC address 
of the users an adversary will be able to track the users. IIDs 
should be unique, producing an IPv6 address that is unique 
within all its applicable scope (local and global) [7]. This type 
of privacy attack is not possible in IPv4 addresses that is 
restricted to local subnet. The location of a node in IPv4 is 
hidden due to the usage of Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol (DHCP), which generates addresses based upon 
availability. Furthermore, the use of network address 
translation (NAT) unintentionally protects a host identity by 
hiding it within a private address space that is not viewable 
externally [4] . 
A user’s privacy in IPv6 implementation can be breached 
through traffic analysis by correlating traffic captured from a 
specific IID. This kind of analysis is also possible in IPv4, but 
only within the lifespan of an address, since DHCP addresses 
change. IPv6 on the other hand permits correlation over 
multiple sessions due to the deterministic address that binds 
users to each of their packets [4]. The usage of temporary IIDs 
(RFC4941 [6]) will not completely solve the problem because 
an adversary can still actively probe multiple subnets for a 
certain IID. A node does not change its IID when moving to a 
new network prefix. Thus, tracking a host remains possible 
within the lifetime of a temporary identifier (in 24 hours). 
RFC7217 has proposed  the inclusion of different network 
parameters when generating IIDs, a solution which is more 
secure although it has not been implemented by manufacturers 
as reported in RFC7217 [8]  
A. Problem Statement 
Figure 1 shows an example of IID generated from MAC 
address as reported in [5] . As it can be seen, an IPv6 IID can 
be generated for a device with a MAC address of 
00:26:08:e6:24:e6 through following steps: 
Step 1: Splitting the MAC address in half 
  002608 |  e624e6 
Step 2: Inserting a constant ff:fe in the middle 
  002608 ff  fee624e6 
Step 3: Changing the format to use a colon delimiter 
  0026:08ff:fee6:24e6 
Step 4 Converting the first eight bits to binary 
  00 → 00000000 
Step 5 Flipping the seventh bit  00000000 → 00000010 
 
Step 6 converting these eight bits back to hexadecimals 
  00000010 → 02 





Figure 1. How EUI-64 addresses are generated from MAC 
Addresses [5]. 
 
Many researchers have shown that using the EUI-64 in 
generating IIDs in IPv6 could compromise users privacy as 
discussed in RFC4941 [6]. Figure 2 shows a Wireshark packet 
capture that has an IID that has been generated using EUI-64.   
 
Figure 2. Showing MAC address of the communicating node 
 
A non-changing IID would allow an eavesdropper to correlate 
unrelated bits of information with a node. According to 
RFC4882 [9] location privacy is of concern for any roaming 
device. Any compromise to location privacy could lead to a 
more targeted profiling of the user activity. An IID that remains 
unchanged across the network could suggest related activity 
[10]. While other researchers like [11] [12] have analyzed how 
different IID generation methods are used against correlation 
attacks. The most recent works on IID generation (RFC7217 
[13] and RFC8064 [14]) propose a new algorithm to generate 
IID by mixing various packet fields in a pseudorandom 
function.  
In this paper, we first discuss and show that deterministic 
addresses have serious privacy implications, and an adversary 
can determine a user’s MAC address from the IPv6. We then 
propose a modification to RFC7217 to include Network_ID as 
a mandatory filed in the calculation of the IID. We then hash it 
using SHA256 algorithm (which takes an input of arbitrary 
length and generates an almost unique 256-bits (32-byte) 
signature of the text [9] [15]). A large hash makes it more 
difficult to invert the function and it ensures that the function is 
collision free [16]. We evaluate the efficiency of the proposed 
method through experimental analysis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides 
background and literature review and explains the existing 
privacy issue. Section 3 explains the proposed approach. 
Section 4 presents the experimental analysis results, and 
Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses future work. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
In this section we provide background information on IPv6 
address generation and then discuss the existing privacy issue. 
The contents of address fields in IPv6 may contain values or 
end with zero-valued fields. Zeros and ones are all valid values 
for any address field as indicated in RFC4291 [17] [18]. IPv6 
addresses of all types are assigned to interfaces, not 
nodes/devices. There are three conventional forms for 
representing IPv6 addresses as text strings. According to [18], 
the preferred form is X:X:X:X:X:X:X:X, where the ‘X’s are 
one to four hexadecimal digits of the eight 16-bit pieces of the 





It is not necessary to write all the leading zeros in an individual 
field, but there must be one numerical in every field, except for 
cases where addresses contain long strings of zeros and in order 
to make writing the zeros easier, a syntax is available to 
compress the zeros using ‘::’. 
For example, the following addresses; 
 
2001:DB8:0:0:8:800:200C:417A (Unicast Address) 
FF01:0:0:0:0:0:0:101  (Multicast Address) 
0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1   (Loopback Address) 
0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0   (Unsigned Address) 





IPv6 address is divided into two parts, network prefix and host 
IID as shown in Figure 3.                                                                           
64bits 64bits 
Network Prefix Host Portion 
 Interface Identifier Field (IID) 
Figure 3.  IPv6 Address format. Each group is expressed as four 
hexadecimal digits separated by colons.  
 
The first 64-bit IPv6 address (i.e., network prefix) is being 
broadcasted by the router, while the second 64-bit (i.e., IID) is 
generated through SLAAC for each host. SLAAC allows the 
network administrator to configure the network and sub 
network bits of the address while each host automatically 
configures the IID.  
 
A. IID GENERATION    
In this section we explore various means of generating the IPv6 
IIDs that are proposed in the literature. 
Presently, there are four methods for generating IID [13]: i) 
EUI-64  ii) Encryption  iii) Random  iv) Stable. 
According to Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), IPv6 
addresses should not be assigned manually, but rather through 
SLAAC or DHCP. However, how to choose between SLAAC 
and DHCP and how to validate the uniqueness of the IPv6 is 
the main challenge [6]. SLAAC and DHCPv6 can be used 
simultaneously. Hosts use SLAAC to obtain IPv6 address and 
DHCPv6 to obtain configuration information such as DNS. If a 
host’s address is assigned by DHCPv6, the whole IPv6 address 
is assigned by the DHCP server address pool.  
If the IPv6 address is assigned by the SLAAC, according to [6], 
hosts configure one or more “stable” addresses composed of 
network prefix that is advertised by a local router and an IID 
that embeds a MAC address. The default mechanism used to 
generate IIDs is modified EUI-64 [13] . This IID is formed by 
extending the 48-bit MAC address to a 64-bit hexadecimal [4]. 
SLAAC is meant to be an alternative to modified EUI-64 
address generation [9]. Modified EUI-64 method is simple and 
does not consume too much computing resources of a node; 
however, this approach exposes the MAC address of the IPv6.  
Encryption method on the other hand generates IIDs by hashing 
the public key and other parameters [13] The network prefix is 
given as a input of a hash function and a node’s 
cryptographically generated address (CGA) changes from one 
network to another network to prevent geographic correlation. 
However, this method is computationally expensive, and it has 
neither been widely implemented nor deployed [19]. 
Temporary addresses, with a short lifetime, were introduced to 
complicate the task of an eavesdropper (RFC4941 [6]). These 
addresses have a few challenges [6]: 
• From the network management point of view, they 
increase the complexity of event logging, 
troubleshooting, enforcing Access Control Lists 
(ACLs)  
• They complicate implementation, making it 
impossible to be implemented in embedded systems.  
Where temporary addresses are not used, all that a host is left 
with is the stable addresses that have been generated from MAC 
address [13]. Addresses that remain stable for the lifetime of a 
host’s connection to a single subnet are viewed as desirable [14] 
.These types of addresses may be viewed as beneficial for 
network management, event logging, enforcement of the 
(ACLs) and provision of quality services [20] [14]. These kind 
of addresses as opposed to temporary addresses in RFC4941 
[5] allow for long lived TCP connections and are more 
desirable when performing server like functions.  
According to [14], nodes should not employ IPv6 address 
generation schemes that embed a stable link layer address in the 
IID. Particularly, nodes should not generate IIDs with schemes 
specified in RFC2464, RFC2467, RFC2470, RFC2491 etc., 
rather, follow the recommendations of RFC7217. A new 
algorithm is therefore proposed by (RFC7217 [13]) for 
generating “stable” IIDs using the following formula. 
 
RID = F(prefix, Net_Iface, Network_ID, DAD_Counter, 
Secret_Key) 
Where: 
RID: is a random (but stable) identifier 
F(): a pseudorandom function (PRF) that MUST NOT be 
computable from outside (without the knowledge of the secret 
key). F() MUST also be difficult to reverse, such that it resists 
attempts to obtain the secret key even when given the samples 
of the output of F() and knowledge of other input parameters. 
The F() should produce an output of at least 64 bits [9]. 
Prefix: this should be the prefix used for SLAAC as learned 
from ICMPv6 router advertisement message or a link local 
IPv6 unicast address 
Net_Iface: This is an implementation-dependent stable 
identifier associated with the network interface for which the 
RID is being generated. The implementation “may” provide a 
configuration option to select the source of the identifier to be 
used for the Net_Iface 
Network_ID: Some of the network specific data that identifies 
the subnet to which this interface is attached, e.g. IEEE 802.11 
Service Set Identifier (SSID). In [21] some ways of generating 
Network_ID is explained. However, this parameter is 
“optional”. Unknown Nework_ID can help in mitigating 
attacks where a victim host connects to the same subnet as the 
attacker and the attacker tries to learn the IID used by the victim 
host for a remote attack [14]. 
DAD_Counter: This parameter resolves Duplicate Address 
Detection (DAD) conflicts. It must be initialized to 0 and 
incremented by 1 for each of the new tentative address 
configuration as a result of DAD conflict. Implementations that 
record DAD_Counter in non-volatile memory for {prefix, 
Net_Iface, Network_ID} must initialize the DAD_Counter to 
the recorded value if such an entry exists in non-volatile 
memory. On a switch, DAD configuration would be: 
  #IPv6 nd dad-attempts <0-255> 
This command is issued at the global configuration level and 
configures the number of neighbor solicitations to send when 
performing duplicate address detection for a unicast address. 
The default setting of DAD is 3 and could vary from 0 to 255. 
Secret_Key: A secret key of at least 128 bits that is not known 
to an attacker must be initialized to a pseudorandom number 
according to [22]. 
After all these processes, an IID is finally obtained by taking as 
many bits from the RID (as computed in the previous step) as 
necessary. This generated IID should be compared against 
reserved IIDs according to [19] and against those IIDs already 
employed in an address of the same network prefix. In the event 
that an unacceptable identifier has been generated, the case 
should be handled the same way as the case of a duplicate 
address [13]. 
 
B. Privacy attacks in the current IID generation methods 
IP address plays an important role in the connectivity of a 
device to a network. On the one hand, it must correctly identify 
the sender and the receiver so that the message reaches the 
intended destination. On the other hand, address-based 
correlation enables attribution of different transactions to the 
same origin which allows an adversary to gain insight into a 
user’s location and activity [12]. EUI-64 address generation 
method violates the privacy of devices by exposing their MAC 
address.  The MAC address of the communicating devices will 
be revealed when devices send or respond to probes [23]. The 
exposure of MAC address introduces two potential 
vulnerabilities: 
• The ability to identify the manufacturer and model of 
the device, thereby permitting targeted attacks 
• The ability to track and correlate user activity 
 
Geographic location discovery has created a security hole for 
adversaries to geolocate devices on the network [24]. An 
adversary can discover the location of a device using GPS by 
employing a rationalizer to examine the frequency changes 
caused in the signal strength transmitted by any sensor enabled 
device e.g. a computer. An adversary can verify the exact 
location of a sensor enabled device using an in-built 
computation inside the device (MAC address) or cloud 
computing [25]. 
III. PROPOSED APPROACH 
In this section, we first describe our considered system and 
attack models, and then present our modified IID generation 
algorithm. 
A. System model 
Our system model is composed of two entities: A user in a 
network and a remote server. The user wishes to connect to a 
remote server (e.g. web server) through Internet (as shown in 
Figure 4). To get an IPv6 address, the router advertises the 
network prefix and the host (i.e., user device) generates its own 
IID. This type of network can function with or without a DHCP 
server because hosts are able to generate their own IPv6 address 
after getting the network prefix from the router.  
Figure 4. System model of a node communicating through EUI-
64 IID 
 
B. Attack Model 
This paper focuses on correlation attack. We consider two types 
of adversaries: 1) an attacker who is inside the user’s network 
(local adversary) and 2) an attacker who is outside the network 
(remote adversary). Both adversaries can launch packet 
analysis using Wireshark to analyze the packets from the user 
and determine the MAC address of the user if the address is 
generated using EUI method shown in Figure 1. MAC 
addresses contain both manufacturer and device identities, 
hence the attacker can discover some of the default 
vulnerabilities in certain devices. A global attacker on the other 
hand is able to conduct a correlation attack by first doing a ping 
sweep to determine the IPv6 addresses that are active in a 
certain network, after this, the adversary can correlate specific 
IPv6 addresses that are active and even geolocate them using 
GPS rationalizer [24] [25]. A global attacker can get a network 
prefix by doing a “whois” query on any of the network Uniform 
Resource Locator (URL). 
 
C. Proposed IID Generation Algorithm 
We propose to make the optional “Network_ID” parameter in 
RFC 7217 to be a “mandatory” filed when generating an IID. 
Similar formula as explained in Section II-A will be used 
including Network prefix, Net_Iface, Network_ID, 
DAD_Counter and Secret_Key parameters as input of a SHA-
256 function to produce a random hexadecimal digit. It should 
be noted that in RFC 7217 the f function has not been explicitly 
specified and it has been left to the implementor. However, as 
the devil is in the detail, we emphasize on the usage of SHA-
256.   
Our proposed method protects the user from the correlation 
attack, as the IID is generated using parameters that are not 
constant. Each time a device changes its location, the IID will 
be recalculated [13]. According to Common Weakness 
Enumeration (CWE) [26], the use of a small seed “few 
parameters” causes weakness during the implementation of an 
architectural security due to predictability. Security is 
determined entirely by the total length of the parameters [27]. 
Including Network_ID will make the total length of our 
parameters longer than the total length of RFC7217. As the 
number of parameters increases, the time required to analyze 
them will increase. Hence, our method will achieve higher 
security leading to increased privacy. However, different 
resources, such as time and space (parameters), should not be 
compared directly, therefore comparing efficiency of different 
algorithms depends on which efficiency measure is more 
important [28]. A 256-bit seed is a good starting point for 
producing a random enough number. For an adversary to 
correlate this newly generated IID, he/she will need to have 
access to all the victim’s parameters to be able to compute the 
hash, which makes it difficult to succeed. 
 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
In this experiment, we describe the parameters used, the test 
environment and a detailed implementation of the approach. In 
order to perform the experiment with the new IID generation 
method we consider the following example value for each of 
the parameters. 
 
Network Prefix: fe80::, Network Interface: wlan0, 
Network_ID: iPhone, DAD Counter: 100, Secret Key: 84a0 
d5aa 52b0 4d35 k567 3aa6 7af5 474c 
 
The secret key is a 128-bit hexadecimal string that looks like 
an IPv6. 
To produce an IID, we use these parameters in a SHA-256 
function to produce a random hexadecimal. 
 
f{fe80:0000:0000:0000, wlan0, iPhone, 100, 84a0 d5aa 52b0 
4d35 k567 3aa6 7af5 474c} 
 
The output of the function is: 
531eb075a9b54885ea5ab75ee306fd85a17518325ab9a84568e
f2692f19e73fa 
Our IID is generated by taking the last 64 bits. Hence, our IID 
will be 08ef:2692:f19e:73fa/64 
 
A. Configuring the test environment 
Our test environment is consisting of a Debian Linux machine 
running on a Linux 4.6 kernel. In this experiment, we use IPv6 
tokens to test if the newly generated IID will diminish the user 
privacy. First, we must verify that the interface we want to 
configure with a token is plumbed using #ifconfig -a 
The output should show a link local address that was 
automatically configured during installation. To configure an 
interface with a token, we use the following command: 
#ip token set ::8ef:2692:f19e:73fa/64 dev <interface> 
 
And repeat this in all the interfaces that will use the token. 
 
B. Experimental Analysis And Results 
The default method for generating node identifiers in IPv6 is 
modified EUI-64. An experiment has been conducted showing 
how this method reveals MAC address of the communicating 
nodes and how we can solve it using randomized IPv6 tokens. 
The use of MAC addresses as node identifiers has been 
discouraged by both RFC7217 and RFC8064 [13] [14], which 
shows how the device MAC address is used to generate the IIDs 
and how an adversary can take advantage of that by doing a 
reverse attack to determine the MAC address of the 
communicating device and to correlate its activities online. 
Figure 5 is a ping test to show that the new IID is working 
correctly. This ping result shows that our new IID has no trace 
of MAC address. 
In order to determine whether our address is working correctly, 
a loopback test is conducted where the communicating node 
sends a signal using the new IPv6 address and then returned 
(looped back) to it. The aim of this test is to determine whether 
our node will fail if it uses the new IPv6 address. From the 
results shown in Figure 5, the address worked successfully. 
 





Figure 5. IPv6 ping results 
 
Figure 6 is a Wireshark packet capture of how our new IID will 
appear in any traffic analysis. Comparing Figure 6 with Figure 
2, it is evident that an adversary cannot conduct a reverse attack 
to determine the MAC address of the communicating node 






Figure 6.  Privacy enhanced IPv6 IID 
 
C. Performance Analysis 
In our case we used AMD-64 Debian Linux. Our experiment 
used a SHA256 to generate the RID. SHA512 hashing will 
perform much faster when compared to SHA256 as shown in 
Figure 7 and Figure 8. However, this comes at a higher cost. 
From a security point of view, it would be pointless to generate 
random hashes using SHA512 because in practical terms, 
SHA256 is just as secure as SHA384 and SHA512 [29]. A 
collision cannot occur in any of them with the current 
foreseeable technology.  Hence, our algorithm will be much 
cheaper to produce and secure. 
When calculating processing power, we need to consider 
electricity cost. This is called efficiency of the processor. An 
increase in the difficulty of processing a hash increases the 
electricity cost. SHA512 makes 25% more rounds than 
SHA256 on a 64-bit processor. SHA512 performs 50% much 
faster than SHA256 for typical data sizes. However, for small 
messages (less than 448 bits) SHA512 will be approximately 





Figure 7. SHA512 hashing speed in amd-64 Linux 




Figure 8 SHA256 hashing speed in amd-64 Linux 
D. DISCUSSION 
Privacy is one of the major challenges of IPv6 implementation. 
The potentiality of attacks that arise from using MAC address 
in RFC4291 and RFC4862 as part of the address generation 
prompted researchers to find ways of addressing the challenge. 
As discussed earlier, temporary address generation proposed by 
RFC4941 limits the capability of network management while 
stable IID generation proposed in RFC7217 enhances privacy 
but does not include all the potential parameters for generating 
IID to enhance privacy. Our method is a modification to 
RFC7217 to include Network_ID field which is optional in 
RFC7217. Based on the results of the experiment, our method 
produces IIDs that are non-deterministic. Additionally, it does 
not reveal user’s MAC address. A comparison between 
different IID generation proposals is provided in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Features of various IID generation methods 
Proposal Usage of 
MAC 




 For device lifetime Low 
RFC486
2 
 For device lifetime Low 
RFC494
1 














V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
IPv6 has revolutionized Internet addressing by allowing more 
devices to connect to the internet. However, its privacy has 
come under attack by generating deterministic IIDs. This 
ability to predict a user’s IPv6 address on any subnet has 
exposed the users to correlation attack. The ease of using 
deterministic IID does not pay back for the privacy that the user 
is forced to surrender. Solutions such as CGA and temporary 
IID have fallen short in addressing the cost of implementation 
and network management, respectively. A new solution that 
generates IIDs by hashing network prefix, network interface, 
Network_ID, DAD counter and secret key has been proposed. 
This method produces nondeterministic 64-bit IID which does 
not contain the device MAC address. Hence, this method 
should be implemented on operating systems to protect the 
privacy of the users. 
One possible future work could be identifying the best way to 
assign our new IID to nodes. Currently, we assigned the IID 
using IPv6 token which tends to be static. Static addresses are 
only recommended for devices that need addresses that do not 
change, for example, network servers. Hosts on the other hand 
need addresses that are dynamic to enhance security. 
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